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53 
WHAT IS THE VALUE OF PARTICIPATION? 
CHAD FLANDERS* 
In the days after the 2012 presidential election, the pictures became 
drearily familiar: long lines at polling places from Election Day; people 
waiting four, five, even six hours in order to vote.1 The causes? Not enough 
polling booths. Not enough election workers. Voting machines that did not 
work, or were too old. Early voting days that were off, then on, then off 
again. The results? Confusion. Frustration. What might have been an 
inspiring picture, had it been the first election in some recently 
democratized country, instead turned into an embarrassment. Even 
Russia—a famously dysfunctional polity—got into the act. In a twist, 
instead of the United States sending election monitors overseas, the 
Russians had their election monitors monitor us.2 They reported back that 
our election machinery was not fit for a first-world country.3 Had it 
happened anywhere else, we might have called the election illegitimate. 
Many American commentators piled on, saying that we needed to do 
something to fix the way we run elections.4 
                                                                                                                 
 * Paper prepared for the Oklahoma Law Review symposium on election law. Visiting 
Fulbright Lecturer, Nanjing University, PRC (2012-2013); Assistant Professor of Law, St. 
Louis University School of Law. Thanks to James Boyer for excellent research assistance, 
and to Christopher Jones for his comments on a previous draft. I am also grateful to William 
Baude, Michael Neblo, and Josh Douglas for conversations over the years on the topics of 
this essay. I am pretty sure they will disagree with much of it; they should not be held 
responsible for any of it. 
Rick Hasen’s work on election law bears special mention as an inspiration and 
motivation for all who work in the field; his Election Law blog is simply essential reading. 
Rick Hasen, ELECTION LAW BLOG, http://electionlawblog.org (last visited July 7, 2013). 
Finally, I am also grateful to the searching and provocative responses to this article by 
Professors Josh Douglas and Michael Pitts. I find it somewhat heartening that they attack me 
from both sides, which makes me hope that by being in the middle, I may have gotten 
something right. 
 1. Lizette Alvarez, Florida’s Votes Go Unclaimed, but This Time Less Depends on 
Them, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/floridas-
votes-unclaimed-but-less-depends-on-them.html?_r=0 (describing delays and long lines at 
Florida polling places). 
 2. US Voting Far from Ideal—Experts, RUSSIA TODAY (Nov. 8, 2012, 6:17 PM), 
http://www.rt.com/politics/us-presidential-election-system-254 (explaining how monitors 
found the United States election system not up to standards of a mature democracy). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., David Frum, America’s Voting System Is a Disgrace, CNN (Nov. 7, 2012, 
6:01 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/05/opinion/frum-election-chaos/index.html (urging 
reform in light of problems at American polling places). 
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Still, the long lines did demonstrate that we, as Americans, are willing to 
wait hours to vote and willing to put up with innumerable obstacles placed 
in our way. But we might ask, naively, why are we willing to do it? 
President Barack Obama, in his November 2012 remarks as President-Elect 
asked us to “never forget that as we speak, people in distant nations are 
risking their lives right now just for a chance to argue about the issues that 
matter, the chance to cast their ballots like we did today.”5 Likewise, in his 
State of the Union address, President Obama paid tribute to a 102-year-old 
woman who waited in line over three hours to cast her vote, and urged us to 
follow her example.6 
An inspiring story, to be sure. But again, why is participation in elections 
such an important value for Americans? It is a very old parlor game of 
economists to question whether it is, indeed, ever “rational” to vote given 
the time and effort it takes to vote (let alone to be an educated voter), and 
how little difference it really makes to the outcome of an election.7 Judge 
Richard Posner, in a famous opinion, mused about how “elusive” the value 
of voting in fact is, and how some people might rationally conclude that 
voting is not really worth the bother.8 
The publication of Professor Richard Hasen’s excellent The Voting Wars 
invites us to inquire more deeply into what the fuss is all about—that is, 
why participation matters.9 Professor Hasen’s book is an exhaustive catalog 
of the various ways in which participation in elections has been botched, 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Remarks at a Victory Celebration in Chicago, Illinois, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 2 (Nov. 7, 2012). 
 6. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 2013 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 11 (Feb. 12, 2013) (“We should follow the example of a North 
Miami woman named Desiline Victor. When Desiline arrived at her polling place, she was 
told the wait to vote might be 6 hours. And as time ticked by, her concern was not with 
her tired body or aching feet, but whether folks like her would get to have their say. And 
hour after hour, a throng of people stayed in line to support her, because Desiline is 102 
years old. And they erupted in cheers when she finally put on a sticker that read ‘I 
voted.’”); see also Morgan Whitaker, Meet Desiline Victor, the 102-Year-Old Voter, 
MSNBC (Feb. 12, 2013, 7:27 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/02/12/meet-desiline-victor-
the-102-year-old-voter-attending-the-sotu/. 
 7. See, e.g., JASON BRENNAN, THE ETHICS OF VOTING (2011); BRYAN CAPLAN, THE 
MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007) 
(examining the puzzle of why people vote, or become educated voters, when it is costly to 
do so and one’s vote does not make much of a difference). 
 8. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007), 
aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 9. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION 
MELTDOWN (2012). 
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delayed, or defeated, and the consequences this has for electoral integrity.10 
Professor Hasen does not give a fully-developed theory of why 
compromising participation is bad (this is not his aim) although he clearly 
thinks it is.11 His book is more descriptive than normative in this respect. 
But we can nonetheless use Professor Hasen’s book as a jumping off 
point to say why we think participation matters. For participation can be a 
value in many ways, just as participation can be frustrated in many ways (as 
the long lines in Florida and elsewhere attest). First, participation can be a 
foundational legitimating value: this explains why we have voting in the 
first place. Second, participation has an obvious expressive value: this is 
why people will vote, and stand in long lines to vote, even if one vote might 
not matter all that much in the end. We vote to be heard. Third, and 
relatedly, participation has an important informational value by giving 
rulers and representatives feedback about what the people are thinking. 
Finally, participation is relevant to larger claims of substantive equality 
between citizens. All of these values can be frustrated, of course, and the 
way these values can be frustrated gives us insight into the values 
themselves. Here, how certain values are frustrated (intentionally or 
unintentionally) can tell us more about why we value participation. 
This paper proceeds in three parts. Part I gives a typology of the values at 
play in democratic participation. That is, what makes participation so 
important? Part II tries to fix what parts of the value of participation are at 
play in what Professor Hasen calls “the voting wars.” Part III looks at 
possible solutions to (or resolutions of) the voting wars: what we can hope 
for, what we should hope for, and what we can be content with. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. According to Professor Hasen: 
The legitimacy of democratic government itself thus depends on faith in the 
rules for casting and counting votes, and in the fairness with which these rules 
are followed and enforced. 
 When belief in election integrity is lacking, bad consequences follow: 
people think their leaders do not serve the popular will or common good but the 
interests of some faction; they doubt their leaders’ legitimacy and thus the 
legitimacy of their laws and executive actions; and they are apt to believe that if 
one group is working to fix elections, it’s not only acceptable but necessary for 
others to do so as well. A lack of faith in elections becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy that undermines faith in democratic governance itself. 
Id. at ix. 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 73, 130, 159-67, 193-97. 
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I. The Values of Participation 
The value of participation is not single, as should be expected from such 
a basic value in American democracy.12 Rather, it encompasses at least four 
separate ideas.13 Some of these ideas have been more or less settled in 
American democracy; others are more controversial. This Part gives a 
typology of some of those values (I make no claim to be exhaustive) 
because doing so will help us get a better idea of what is at stake in what 
Professor Hasen calls “the voting wars.” Diagnosing what values are in play 
in participation will help us better understand how to resolve the voting 
wars, or at least to prioritize our responses to them. 
A. Participation and Legitimacy 
We begin at the beginning: with first principles. There are several ways 
of looking at political legitimacy, but the way that we, that is Americans, 
have settled on is the idea of the consent of the governed.14 No regime can 
be legitimate (we think) if it does not allow the people in some fashion to 
choose its rules and its rulers. That “in some fashion” is important, at least 
at this level of the value of participation. The value of participation is the 
value of giving the people some input in choosing their leaders. If we did 
not have that, we could not be said to be living in a legitimate political 
regime—at least this is America’s story about legitimacy.15 We would be 
living in something else—maybe something better on some other measure 
(economic growth or personal security), but failing on the metric of 
legitimacy. 
How are we to understand this foundational value? In political theory, 
the argument goes something like this: In order to be ruled legitimately, I 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, J. DEMOCRACY, July 1999, at 3, 
10-11 (vol. 10. No. 3). 
 13. My list overlaps somewhat with Professor Sen’s, but not entirely. Where I find four 
values worth emphasizing, Professor Sen finds three: “[F]irst, the intrinsic importance of 
political participation and freedom in human life; second, the instrumental importance of 
political incentives in keeping governments responsible and accountable; and third, the 
constructive role of democracy in the formation of values, and in the understanding of needs, 
rights, and duties.” Id. at 11. 
 14. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 52 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690). 
 15. Other states might find legitimacy along some other lines (economic growth, 
national security, stability, etc.). I make no claim here that democracy is the only legitimate 
form of government, though I suspect this is probably true. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss1/3
2013]        WHAT IS THE VALUE OF PARTICIPATION? 57 
 
 
must give consent to that rule.16 This flows from a more general idea of 
autonomy: no one can make me do something that I do not consent to. So 
too when it comes to collective rule: you can only do something to us if we 
agree to it. Democracy is just the formulation of this principle of 
legitimacy. If you do not get the agreement of the people to let you govern 
them, then you cannot govern them legitimately. 
A lot is left unsettled by this broad principle. How many people need to 
be able to vote in order for there to be a genuinely collective will? How 
many people actually need to vote in order for there to be a legitimate 
democracy? We say, in America, that we live in a democracy, but if less 
than fifty percent vote in an election, is there a really a collective will?17 Or 
is this an example of minority tyranny—the few voters ruling over the 
many who have not (but who could have) voted? What if I am on the losing 
end of an election? Am I no longer being governed by my consent, because 
those for whom I voted are not actually ruling over me? 
Let me abstract from these questions for the moment to stress two points 
about the intrinsic value of participation. The first is that I think it is 
compatible with a state being a democracy that not everybody votes, and 
even that not everybody is able to vote. America before the Nineteenth 
Amendment and the Civil Rights Movement was still a democracy, but it 
was an imperfect one—in many respects a badly imperfect one. So we need 
to make a distinction between some groups being prevented from 
participating and a state as a whole being democratic. A democracy can still 
be a democracy even if many groups are excluded by law from 
participation.18 
The second point is that, of course, there is still a wrong when people are 
denied the franchise. Indeed, there is a problem when even one person is 
denied the right to vote.19 This relates back to consent. If you are going to 
rule over me, you at least have to ask me, and I need a reasonable chance of 
giving an answer. If you do not ask, then you have violated my autonomy 
and maybe my dignity as well. Or, as we might put it, participation is 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Tom Christiano, Democracy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (July 27, 2006), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy (discussing major justifications of democracy). 
 17. See Jonathan Levine, The Case for Compulsory Voting, NAT’L INT. (Nov. 2, 2012), 
http://www.nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-case-compulsory-voting-7691 (noting recent 
low-turnout elections). 
 18. Of course, there may be a point when so many groups are excluded that the 
government ceases to be a democracy. 
 19. See Chad Flanders, How to Think About Voter Fraud (And Why), 41 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 93, 146 (2007). 
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necessary for a regime to legitimately rule over any given person. If he or 
she cannot participate, the legitimacy of government action over that person 
is put into question. 
B. Participation as Expression 
Another value of participation is its expressive role. Participation is a 
way we can show others what we think and believe. This does not just 
come across in for whom we choose to vote (although it does include that). 
There is the very act of voting itself that says something: it says that we are 
citizens,20 or that we believe passionately about democracy, or that (at the 
least) we want to be seen as caring about American politics, or we just do 
not want to be told “if you don’t vote, you can’t complain.” Just going out 
to vote is expressive, even if you are not eligible to vote or if your ballot is 
spoiled. Indeed, standing in line to vote is also expressive (and the longer 
you stand, the more expressive it might be). 
Of course, for whom you vote is also expressive, even if you vote for no 
one at all or if you vote for Donald Duck.21 The actual content of your vote 
is expressive—even if you “throw your vote away” on a third-party 
candidate who has no shot at winning. So both the act of voting and what 
you do with your vote (that is, for whom you vote) have expressive value. 
They say something about you—similar, perhaps, to the way in which the 
clothes you wear or (more relevantly) the bumper stickers you put on your 
car or the sign you put on your lawn has expressive value. You can also tell 
people of your vote, and then the content of your vote becomes more 
obviously expressive (more so than if you are just one vote tallied among 
others). 
It is this “expressive” aspect of the value of participation that closely 
aligns it with the First Amendment idea of freedom of expression.22 You 
can march on a street corner with a sign, or you can stand in line to vote and 
then you can actually vote and have that vote recorded. Or you can refuse to 
vote because you do not think your vote matters or you do not care for the 
candidates. These are all ways of expressing yourself politically, some more 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. at 147-48. 
 21. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992). 
 22. See Burdick v. Takushi, 737 F. Supp. 582, 587 (D. Haw. 1990) (“Being able to vote 
for the candidate of one’s choice, even when that candidate is not one of the listed 
candidates on the ballot, is the type of significant political expression which the First 
Amendment was designed to protect.”), rev’d, 937 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 504 U.S. 
428 (1992). 
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important than others (and which ones are more important will be different 
at different times). 
We should note that participation as expression goes both ways. Just as 
participating in an election can express what you believe, denying people 
the right to vote expresses something as well—something pretty important. 
If people cannot vote because they are denied it under the law, or because 
they face obstacles to voting, or because they are intimidated, this sends a 
message about what the government thinks about them—that they are not 
full citizens or that their opinions do not count. No amount of other means 
of additional expression can undo this harm to the fundamental value of 
participation. 
C. Participation and Information 
The above values associated with participation are more or less intrinsic 
to participation itself. They do not hold out participation as a means to some 
goal, but rather as simply valuable in its own right. Participation is valuable 
because it is necessary to legitimacy, and because by our participation we 
can express something about ourselves or about how we feel about our 
government. 
But, of course, participation does further other ends besides itself; so it is 
also valuable as a means to those ends. Chief among these ends is 
information: voting does a good job, although perhaps not a perfect job, of 
telling rulers what the people think and want. Elections are in their own 
way a sort of “preference poll” of a certain set of the population. 
The classic instance of voting having an informational role is Professor 
Amartya Sen’s work on democracies and famines.23 Democracies, 
Professor Sen showed, were less susceptible to famines because the people 
would let their rulers know through democratic means that something in the 
machinery of the market or the government was breaking down, resulting in 
food shortages.24 But this is, of course, an extreme example. There are 
other, smaller ways in which popular elections can inform those in 
government; sometimes this can be as minor as a shift in the national 
“mood” to which politicians nevertheless must respond. Other times, the 
vote can reveal that there is a serious mandate for change in the country. 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See Sen, supra note 12, at 6-9. Professor Sen’s work has been controversial. See, e.g., 
Michael Massing, Does Democracy Avert Famine?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/01/arts/does-democracy-avert-famine.html?pagewanted= 
all&src=pm. 
 24. Sen, supra note 12, at 6-9. 
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Could a poll more simply do the same work as an election? Nate Silver’s 
impressive work in predicting the 2008 and 2012 elections may make us 
think something like this.25 So we can ask: Why not just have a much better 
(possibly more representative) poll serve the informational function of an 
election? There are, indeed, sound points to be made against the 
representativeness of popular opinion in elections, especially with low 
turnout (sometimes less than half of the electorate). Alternatively, this may 
be an argument not for replacing elections with polls, but for making voting 
mandatory.26 And it still remains the case that even if a poll could do a 
better job of providing information, the other, non-instrumental values of 
participation would not be satisfied. Nor does it allow for the possibility 
that what people say with their votes may turn out to be different than what 
they tell a pollster. 
D. Equal Participation 
There remains one more value to consider in relationship to participation, 
and that is equality. Equality is not a value of participation per se; rather, it 
goes to how participation is (or is not) distributed. In modern democracies, 
it is thought that participation should be equally distributed, or at least as 
close to equally distributed as is legally and practically possible. 
I do not think that the value of participation requires participation be 
equal. More specifically (and as I mentioned above), democracy qua 
democracy does not require equal participation by all groups. Certainly this 
is not entailed in the idea that democracy requires some participation to be 
considered a democracy. Democracy only requires that some of the people, 
in some capacity, have the ability to choose their leaders. 
So if equal participation is a value, it is neither intrinsic to democracy 
nor even intrinsic to the individual’s right to participate. One’s right to 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY MOST PREDICTIONS FAIL—BUT 
SOME DON’T (2012); see, e.g., Nate Silver, Special Coverage: The 2012 Presidential 
Election, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2012, 10:10 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2012/11/06/live-blog-the-2012-presidential-election; Nate Silver, Welcome (and 
Welcome Back) to FiveThirtyEight, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2010, 11:25 AM), http://fivethirty 
eight.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/25/welcome-and-welcome-back/. 
 26. See Levine, supra note 17; see also THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S 
EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED 
WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 142 (2012) (offering a similar mandatory voting 
proposal). 
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participate is not necessarily diminished by the fact that others cannot 
participate.27 
To see how equality operates as a separate value, independent from the 
foundational value of democracy, note that equality among citizens can be 
realized just as much by abolishing the franchise altogether as by expanding 
the franchise. We could realize the value of equality by saying that no one 
can vote, just as much as we could by saying that everyone can vote. So we 
are dealing here with something that is not reducible, or translatable, into 
the foundational participatory value of democracy, but with something that 
instead is closer to respect. We show a lack of respect when we allow some 
groups of people to be part of some activity, whether it be voting or 
marriage or something else,28 and others not part of the same activity on an 
arbitrary basis. 
But what counts as an arbitrary basis? This indeed is the rub, and will be 
a main point of contention in the “voting wars.” When does excluding 
somebody mean a violation of equal treatment? And when does it not? 
Discrimination based on either race or gender is an absolute violation of 
equality when it comes to voting rights.29 Age is also thought to be at some 
point a violation of equality,30 but determining the exact age at which it 
becomes so is a matter of dispute.31 Why eighteen years of age, and not 
twenty-one? Why not sixteen? Finally, there is also class, which in the form 
of a poll tax is a violation of equality between rich and poor, but perhaps 
not in the form of requiring a photo identification which costs money.32 
                                                                                                                 
 27. By contrast, some argue that your right to vote can be diminished if too many 
people vote—for example, if some vote who are not registered to vote. See Purcell v. 
Gonzales, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam). The result is a “diluted vote.” See id. I return to 
this point in considering voter fraud. 
 28. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2097 (2005) 
(making the comparison between the right to vote and the right to marry). When a good is 
distributed unequally, we hurt those who do not receive the good both because they do not 
have the good (the intrinsic violation) and because others have it and they do not (the 
equality violation). 
 29. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; id. amend. XIX, § 1. 
 30. See id. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
 31. Vivian Hamilton, How Young Should Voters Be?: 16-Year-Olds’ Entitlement to the 
Most Basic Civil Right [Part V], CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 22, 2013, 2:30 PM) 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/01/how-young-should-voters-be-16-
year-olds-entitlement-to-the-most-basic-civil-right-part-v.html. 
 32. See Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The 
People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 71-75, 138-44 (2009); see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXIV, § 1. 
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In addition to equal access, there is also of course equal impact, a factor 
at issue in the great redistricting cases of the twentieth century.33 The idea 
that some districts should have more heavily weighted votes than other 
districts was also thought to be a sin against equal treatment.34 But, just as 
with the question of access, there are questions of how equal things must 
be. Must districts be precisely numerically equal? If there is variation, how 
great can that variation be? (This obviously has implications for Senate 
representation as well as the Electoral College, both of which we tolerate.) 
What we can say, now, is simply this: at some point, it is unfair if some 
peoples’ votes weigh more than others, not because some cannot vote, but 
because some votes do not count for as much as other votes. 
II. The Voting Wars and The Voting Wars 
What is at stake in the voting wars? At least one thing at stake is the 
value of participation, in one or more of the four guises listed above. We 
care about voting because we care about the values of participation. But 
participation can be more or less valuable, more or less important. The 
denial of a group’s right to vote is worse than the denial of an individual’s 
right to vote, and not just because more people are affected by the former. 
Or take another example: A person who has to wait in line for several 
hours, or has to drive a half hour to get to her polling place, has the value of 
her participation degraded less than a person who has to pass a literacy test 
or pay a poll tax in order to vote.35 Of course, participation is not the only 
thing at stake in the voting wars, but it is the main thing. 
This Part first looks at extreme examples where the values of 
participation have been compromised almost totally. It then looks at mild 
examples, where the values of participation are affected in a minor way, 
and possibly not at all. In between these two extremes lie many of the cases 
that Professor Hasen focuses on in The Voting Wars.36 Those examples are 
covered in detail in the final section of this Part; they are interesting 
because some seem to fall closer to the extreme violations, where others 
seem to be barely violations at all. 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727 (1983); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. 
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 715 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964). 
 34. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 744 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[P]olitical gerrymandering is 
one species of ‘vote dilution’ that is proscribed by the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 35. Though this may depend on the facts: if the polling places have deliberately been 
made to be hard to reach, then this may be worse (or the same as) a literacy test or a poll tax. 
 36. See HASEN, supra note 9. 
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A. Major Violations of the Value of Participation 
If we think of the worst violations of participation, we see how they are 
bad, precisely because they diminish or destroy nearly all of the values of 
participation listed in Part I. To start with the obvious examples: male 
African Americans who were denied the right to vote prior to the passage of 
the Fifteenth Amendment; women who were excluded from the franchise 
prior to the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment; and African Americans 
(again) who were effectively blocked out of the vote by literacy tests and 
Jim Crow.37 These are the classic and the most embarrassing and shameful 
instances of the near total exclusion from participation of groups we now 
rightly consider to be full citizens. 
Their exclusion was obviously bad, but why was it so bad? To start with, 
it was bad because the foundational value of participation was violated. 
Certainly, the exclusion of many from the vote made the United States less 
of a democracy: it was exercising power (sometimes egregiously coercive 
power) over those who had no say in the direction of what was nominally 
their government. To this extent, the United States as a whole was a less-
legitimate government than it might have otherwise been. In addition, there 
was a wrong at the individual level: all persons who were denied the right 
to vote, either because they were not granted the right (pre-amendment 
women and African Americans) or because the barriers to voting effectively 
deprived them of the vote, were individually being unjustly coerced. 
After these, the other wrongs of denying participation may seem to pale 
in comparison. However, there was still a great wrong in the fact that the 
franchise was not just denied to everybody, but also allowed to some and 
denied to others. This is bad in two respects. First, it is a violation of the 
principle of equality, which, as we said, is not intrinsic to the value of 
participation, but is powerfully associated with it. When groups of people 
who share a particular characteristic are denied the right to vote, the wrong 
of denying them participation gets amplified. It is not just a denial of this 
person’s or that person’s right to vote, but is also a violation of equal 
treatment.38 And the denial of equal treatment is not only a wrong against 
the value of equality; it also represents an expressive harm. Not only are 
certain groups unable to express their opinions, but that exclusion is a 
powerful expression of society’s contempt or disregard for them. 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 2009). 
 38. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 744 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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The informational value of participation may also seem relatively small 
in comparison to the fundamental denial of the right to vote and the 
violation of equal treatment. But we should not underestimate it. By 
preventing groups from being able to signal their needs and opinions, a 
further wrong was done. The needs of minorities and women went unmet, 
not only because politicians did not have an electoral incentive to heed 
them, but also because they did not have the information that letting those 
groups vote would have given them. Denying the vote is wrong, of course, 
but it begets further wrongs: a non-responsive—in part because it is 
uninformed—governing class.39 
B. Minor Violations of the Value of Participation 
In a controversial decision on photo identification laws, Judge Richard 
Posner famously referred to those “who are eligible to vote [but] don’t 
bother to do so”—they said, “what the hell,” and stayed home rather than 
getting the necessary identification needed to vote.40 Judge Posner 
obviously had little sympathy for such voters: if they were not able to vote, 
it was on them, not on the government.41 They only had themselves to 
blame. 
Whether we think Judge Posner was right about the particular case of 
photo identification, there is a more general thing he does seem to get right. 
There is some point where the fault for not being able to vote rests more on 
the voter than on the government.42 For there must be some regulations that 
say who can vote and who cannot vote that are not based on invidious 
distinctions (race, gender, class), but are instead simply based on the 
necessity of having an ordered and orderly election. We have to be able to 
make sure that people will vote in the right places, that they will not vote 
twice, and that their votes will be counted in the right way. As the Supreme 
Court said in Storer v. Brown, “as a practical matter, there must be a 
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if 
                                                                                                                 
 39. In this way, initial violations of an equal right to vote can snowball: denial of an 
equal vote means less ability to influence future state action (including the removal of the 
conditions that created the inequality in the first place). 
 40. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 
553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 41. See id. 
 42. See Chad Flanders, Spelling Murkowski: The Next Act: A Reply to Fishkin and 
Levitt, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 49, 54 (2011). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss1/3
2013]        WHAT IS THE VALUE OF PARTICIPATION? 65 
 
 
some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic 
processes.”43 
So, in order to vote, people will have to register in some manner, they 
may have to wait in line before they vote, and they may have to show some 
proof that they are who they say that they are. Each of these may 
discourage some from participation. People may not want to go to the 
trouble of registering, or they may not want to wait in line, or they may not 
bring the right form of identification. As a result, these people will not be 
able to vote.44 
Do such requirements for participation as such represent a degradation of 
the value of participation? They do, but they are relatively minor in the 
whole scheme of things. Someone who is subject to inconvenience or delay 
is not being denied his right to vote; he still has the ability to participate. So 
there is no violation of the fundamental value of participation: the person 
still has the right to consent or not to consent to the government—at some 
point, he or she is just choosing not to. There may even be an expressive 
value in not participating when you have the right to participate; and non-
participation can perform an informational function. An apathetic electorate 
can, in its own way, send a message; and sometimes it may even be 
intending to send a message by not voting. 
In other words, there is a difference between being denied the right to 
vote, either legally or by obstacle after (deliberate) obstacle, and being 
constrained or limited in trying to vote by reasonable requirements or 
practical impediments. A democracy is imperfect if many of its citizens do 
not vote, but much less imperfect than a democracy that denies many of its 
citizens the right to vote. A voting system that has a 0.03% error-rate is bad, 
but not nearly as bad as one that has a 10% error rate. Some errors are 
unavoidable, and some voters (as Judge Posner said) simply will not be 
bothered to vote, no matter how easy it becomes to do so.45 
There is, of course, a persuasive case that the government should do 
more to encourage voting and to make it easier to vote—that there are many 
                                                                                                                 
 43. 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). 
 44. Senator Rand Paul recently seemed to suggest that it should be difficult to vote. Josh 
Douglas, “People Should Get Off Their Butts” to Register and Vote, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 
21, 2013, 1:41 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/02/people-should-get-
off-their-butts-to-register-and-vote.html. I disagree: it should be relatively easy to vote. But 
at the same time, that it is sometimes difficult to vote is not per se a diminishment of a 
person’s right to vote. We have to see how difficult it is and if others face the same 
difficulty, and also (obviously) whether the proposed obstacle is a reasonable restriction. 
 45. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951. 
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positive obligations the government has that it is not meeting.46 I agree. But 
the government cannot do everything, and there will inevitably be 
difficulties for some to get out to vote (work, children, or other obligations) 
and mistakes in tabulation (simply by human error). These diminish some 
of the values of participation, but not to such a degree that the values are 
not realized at all. Indeed, it is an open question whether any voting regime 
can fully realize all the values of participation: it would require one hundred 
percent turnout, perfect tabulation, and an immense amount of resources. 
This is not only impossible—to some extent, it is not desirable. As the 
conclusion to this essay indicates, participation is less an all-or-nothing 
thing, and more a more-or-less thing.47 More is better, but a little less is not 
the same as nothing. 
C. The Voting Wars 
Professor Hasen’s new book, The Voting Wars, is a brilliant report from 
the frontlines of election law. He shows how, as Professor Josh Douglas 
recently put it,48 election law has become a year-round affair, rather than a 
once in every four years phenomena.49 Election battles are being fought 
well before elections, in an aim to game the system in favor of one 
candidate or another. They are also becoming increasingly bitter and (in 
what seems to be Professor Hasen’s major take-away point) partisan.50 But 
some of these battles seem worth worrying about and some seem relatively 
minor, as Professor Hasen would probably admit. 
1. Stupidity 
A common theme throughout Professor Hasen’s book is that we should 
not mistake stupidity on the part of those who run elections for intentional 
maliciousness.51 There are plenty of instances of stupidity in Professor 
Hasen’s book: from the design of ballots to keeping election results on 
one’s laptop and then misplacing them.52 These accidents, or blunders, have 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Joseph Fishkin, Voting as a Positive Right: A Reply to Flanders, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 
29, 33 (2011). 
 47. See infra Part IV. 
 48. Josh Douglas, Election Law as an Everyday Activity, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 1, 2013, 
06:04 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/02/election-law-as-an-every 
day-activity.html. 
 49. See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 9, at 5, 131-57. 
 50. See, e.g., id. at 4-6, 88-97, 193-97. 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 7, 45-47, 116-20, 149-55, 159-75. 
 52. Id. at 2-4, 119, 159-81. 
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serious consequences, but they are, by and large in Professor Hasen’s 
telling, innocent (even if stupid and relatively avoidable) mistakes.53 
Professor Hasen is right that we should not put too much stock in these 
mistakes qua mistakes because they do not fundamentally damage any of 
the values of participation. They do not threaten democracy, they do not 
express contempt or disregard for voters individually or as a group, and 
they do not deprive us of any real information about voters (although they 
do tell us about the need for institutional safeguards against stupid 
mistakes). Of course, this all changes when there are massive mistakes, but 
Professor Hasen does not give any examples of these. 
So, these sorts of instances should be put at the minor end of the voting 
wars. We should not, Professor Hasen urges, read too much into them,54 
and he is right. They show the need for reform, but not much more than 
this. They also show that some toleration for error is almost built into the 
value of participation, as long as the error does not become too large or 
systematic.55 
2. The “Fraudulent Fraud Squad” 
The issue of voter fraud is certainly one of the major issues, if not the 
major issue, that constitutes the voting wars in Professor Hasen’s telling.56 
The interest in fraud revealingly lines up along partisan lines. Those on the 
right point to the dangers of fraud; those on the left focus on the dangers of 
enforcing measures against fraud too aggressively, especially given the 
limited number of cases of actual fraud. Professor Hasen clearly favors 
those on the left, and makes a compelling case that the true evidence of in-
person voter fraud is really quite thin57—and I mostly agree with him. 
But it is important to note (abstracting from the empirical questions 
temporarily) that the value of participation seems to be on both sides of the 
debate.58 Those who worry about fraud worry about how individual votes 
might be canceled out by fraudulent ones; they worry that those who are not 
registered to vote might corrupt the process, both in terms of results (who 
should win) and in terms of information (for example, what the actual 
margin of victory is). Those who worry about overreacting to fraud worry 
about people who should be allowed to vote being excluded from voting; 
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 56. See HASEN, supra note 9, at 41-73. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See Flanders, supra note 19, at 133. 
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they worry about barriers to voting being artificially high, to the point 
where some people are not just burdened in their exercise of the franchise, 
but actually deprived of the franchise. 
How severe these diminishments of the value of participation are 
depends on the facts. If voter fraud is massive and barriers to registration 
and voting are minor, then those on the pro-photo identification side may be 
correct that there is a major violation of the value of participation by fraud. 
Those who are properly registered have the values of their votes diluted,59 
and the results of the election might (again, if fraud is truly widespread), at 
the limit, mean that American politics is only quasi-legitimate: those whose 
votes should count are not exercising their proportionate influence over the 
process. 
However, if voter fraud is comparatively limited and barriers to 
registration are in some cases quite large and not merely an inconvenience, 
then the anti-photo identification side might be correct that requiring photo 
identification also would represent a major violation of the value of 
participation—and, interestingly, in a similar way as those who are pro-
identification. Those who cannot vote because they do not have and cannot 
obtain the proper identification are having their individual participation 
denied, and if many people are similarly situated then American politics 
loses some of its legitimacy. 
Only knowing the facts will tell us who, in fact, is correct in this debate. 
I suspect that the facts show very little evidence of in-person voter fraud, so 
the risk (as Professor Hasen persuasively shows) does seem to be 
exaggerated.60 But this does not settle the debate because if the barriers to 
getting the right kind of identification are more of an inconvenience than an 
obstacle, then the failure to realize the value of participation in any given 
instance might be simply on the voter who (paraphrasing Judge Posner) just 
could not be bothered.61 If the voter did not want to vote (or is under-
motivated to vote), the value of participation is not too corrupted in his case 
because he at least had the chance to vote, but chose for whatever reason 
not to exercise it. Whether this is true may be only decidable on a case-by-
case basis: how easy it is to get photo identification in a state, what 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See Purcell v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam). 
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allowance is made for provisional voting, and the limitations of the 
individual voter.62 
But there is a further wrinkle to this debate, for we have not yet covered 
the equality aspect of the right to participation, which seems to play a 
serious role here. The impact of most photo identification laws seems to fall 
disproportionately on some groups, most notably the poor, but also African 
Americans and the elderly.63 And here we may face the difficulty that goes 
beyond the denial of an individual’s right to vote in a particular case: the 
demand for greater identification (even types of identification that are many 
times easily available) that creates a greater burden for some groups and not 
for other groups goes against the value of equal participation.64 The fact that 
the “fraud squad” seems to target some voters and not others65 may be what 
is most problematic about their actions, and not merely their demand for 
greater requirements per se. 
3. Intimidation and Deception 
If someone is deceived about where he can vote, whether he can vote, or 
when he can vote, or if someone is scared away from voting by a threat, 
then there are obviously violations of the value of participation in the 
individual instance. A person who does not vote because she is given bad 
information or she is told that bad consequences will follow from her vote 
does not have a chance to give consent to those who would govern her. But 
this gets us to the question: What counts as deception or intimidation? 
This is a surprisingly complex question. For if a poll worker mistakenly 
puts up bad information, a voter may be misled into going to the wrong 
polling place, but she is not deceived. So deception requires a deliberate 
attempt to mislead voters: when this happens, this violates the individual’s 
value in participating, and (if it is targeted at a group, as it sometimes is) it 
could represent a violation of the value of equal participation. 
Intimidation is another concept that is hard to define, partly because of 
its unquestionably subjective cast: different people might be afraid of 
different things, and so be deterred from voting for more or less compelling 
reasons. In his book, Professor Hasen investigates the case of the Black 
Panthers in front of a Pennsylvania polling place (a notorious obsession of 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 209-13 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (per 
curiam). 
 63. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 955-57 (Evans, J., dissenting). 
 64. Moreover, this denial of equal protection has a further impact on the expressive and 
informational values of voting. I thank James Boyer for pointing this out to me. 
 65. See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 9, at 41-43, 50-51. 
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Fox News for many weeks).66 It seems wrong to call that a case of 
intimidation and by so doing imply that some might have been legitimately 
deterred from voting (this is so even if some might have been scared off 
from voting by the sight of the Panthers). But one might imagine worse 
cases. If the intimidation is targeted, effective, and represents a threat that 
some might legitimately take seriously (as opposed to some vague fear), 
then these cases of intimidation might represent a denial of the value of 
individual participation. If the threat is targeted at a group, then equality 
values again come into play. 
4. Early Voting 
A major source of contention in the 2012 election was early voting—
when it was available, whether it was available, and to whom it was 
available.67 The lack of opportunities for early voting was suspected to have 
led, in some cases, to greater delays on the actual day of voting.68 In a few 
states, there was a back and forth on the part of officials about whether and 
when early voting would take place, leading to confusion and uncertainty 
among voters.69 But was this confusion, uncertainty, and delay a mere 
inconvenience, or was it something more? 
There are at least two issues here. First, is early voting required in order 
to realize the value of participation? I doubt it; although in many cases early 
voting makes it easier for people to vote, the limited number of days to vote 
(at the limit, only having one day to vote) does not per se degrade the value 
of participation. Again, the state does not have an obligation to make it 
maximally easy for people to vote; it has pragmatic and administrative 
concerns to tend to. The state just (and this is a big “just”) has to remove 
unreasonable obstacles to voting. Nor does delay on the day of voting per se 
represent a denial or even a degradation of the value of participation. 
People need only a reasonable opportunity to participate, not a guarantee of 
participation (should such a thing even be possible). 
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A second issue is why early voting was in some cases limited. If it is a 
question of resources, this seems to me one thing. Lack of money can 
explain why some polling places could not be open on days other than 
Election Day.70 Not having enough money as the reason for not having 
early voting seems to me not on its face objectionable; it is more like a fact 
of the world than an invidious force preventing people from voting. 
But there could be other, less benign motivations for limiting early 
voting—namely, to create additional obstacles for certain groups of voters: 
poorer voters, say, or voters of a particular party. If early voting is taken 
away (or promised to some and not to others), then we do have a serious 
violation of the value of participation because now participation is no 
longer equal. It becomes tiered. 
This point, in fact, can be generalized. Mere economic motives, if they 
are the cause of delays at the polling places (because of no early voting, 
lack of polling machines, or some other reason), are in general relatively 
minor degradations of the values of participation. To some degree, there 
will always be limitations on one’s ability to vote under the United States 
system, where voting is not mandatory and the voter accepts some of the 
responsibility in actually going out to vote.71 So long as we broadly accept 
this system (something considered in the next section), limitations on one’s 
ability to vote without delay will be inevitable and more or less acceptable. 
They may make us upset but, generally, we should put up with them. 
But something else happens when a lack of economic resources is not 
just a fact, but something that becomes used as a pretext to deprive some 
voters of their opportunities to vote. In this case, it is not the individual 
value of participation that matters, but the equality value. Now, it is not 
merely a question of some barriers being put up in front of voting (for there 
will always be barriers), but some voters having to meet those barriers and 
others not. As a result, we have the same problem that we faced with photo 
identification and voter intimidation and deception. All of these things are 
problems, and they can diminish the value of participation, but they seem to 
me only serious problems when they involve not just additional barriers, but 
                                                                                                                 
 70. A lack of money could explain other problems as well, such as an inadequate 
number of polling booths or outdated or poorly working polling machines. 
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barriers that affect people unequally. The voting wars get serious when they 
implicate not only participation, but equal participation.72 
5. Partisanship 
I have so far almost entirely omitted discussion of a theme that pervades 
Professor Hasen’s book, and that is partisanship.73 The voting wars are, in 
Professor Hasen’s telling, a party-oriented affair: battles over voting are in 
fact proxy fights between Republicans and Democrats (and to a lesser 
extent, by Republicans and Democrats against third parties).74 The people 
deciding how elections in America should be run and how they should be 
won are mostly partisan officials. Partisanship, as Hasen’s book instructs 
us, is pretty much why we have the voting wars in the first place. In other 
words, partisanship is not a problem; it is the problem. 
Consider how partisanship can pop up and infect every stage of voting 
and participation. Partisans may draw district lines in ways that favor one 
party over the other, then they may restrict early voting or institute voter ID 
because it means fewer members of the other party can vote, and then they 
may fight to have the rules for counting ballots be one way rather than 
another because that means they win (or have the process run by a partisan 
official). Indeed it is very rare to see an election rule that will not skew in 
favor of one party rather than another, and indeed deliberately so. 75 Even 
election season stupidity might be because of partisanship when we choose 
election officials based on party loyalty rather than competence. In short, all 
of the problems listed in this section may, in the end, be problems about 
partisanship. 
 Indeed, the election problems we have might be more manageable and 
less intractable if we didn’t have partisans deciding election battles. It is 
pretty easy to see why. When we put party into the mix, election law rules 
look zero-sum: what helps one party will hurt the other party. So a problem 
isn’t something both parties can solve together, but something which each 
party tries to manipulate to its advantage. Moreover, once one party has the 
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rules in its favor, it can build on that edge—compounding its advantage—in 
election after election. 
 So long as one party sees an advantage in limiting the participation of 
some people or groups of people, the voting wars will go on and on.76 This 
leads naturally to the question: Could the voting wars ever end absent some 
wholesale change in the system? If not, are the voting wars something we 
should learn to live with? 
III. Will the Voting Wars Be Resolved? Can They? 
Professor Hasen vividly presents the battles and fights of the voting 
wars. He is an expert at showing where the problems are located and how 
they happen. He is, however, less sanguine about “solving” them. President 
Obama’s proposal of a non-partisan election commission in his State of the 
Union address can be viewed as a step in the right direction,77 but 
commissions have a sad history of being ignored or simply kicking the can 
down the road.78 We will have to wait and see. But if we cannot hope for 
quick fixes or immediate solutions—especially given the present political 
climate—we can think about how to approach the problems, and here I 
have some suggestions based on the above analysis. What follows makes 
three points: first, that we should consider participation mostly as a value 
and less so as a right; second, that we should be especially attentive to 
violations of the value of equal participation; and finally, (echoing 
Professor Hasen) that we should be humble in attempting to fix the problem 
of political polarization by fixing our electoral machinery. 
A. Rights and Values 
I have deliberately phrased points in this paper in terms of the value of 
participation. It is, however, more common to hear people discuss the right 
to vote, a right that cannot be infringed or even burdened unless the state 
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has a very strong countervailing interest.79 Of course, it is not a matter of 
either protecting the right to vote or recognizing the value of participation. 
Part of the value of participation can be explained by saying that we have a 
right to participate. But this has to be explicated further. What does the 
right of participation mean, and why is it valuable? One way of looking at 
why participation is intrinsically valuable is that we usually need to consent 
to have somebody (or something) do something to us. Voting is one way we 
can give our consent to the government to push us around. 
I am wary about putting too much emphasis on the right to vote, as 
opposed to the multiple values that participation promotes or embodies. For 
one, it is too easy to fall into the idea that rights are “trumps” and should 
outweigh any and all pragmatic considerations. But the right to vote costs 
money to implement, and, more saliently, to have organized voting and 
regulated voting means putting all sorts of incidental burdens on the right to 
vote. This is not just about fraud or efficiency: this is about having an 
orderly process through which we can legitimately say a democratic will is 
formed. We have registration and identification checks, as well as other 
processes, to make sure people are voting in the right place and at the right 
time, and (yes) to make sure that no one votes who should not vote. All of 
these burdens end up putting some limitations on the right to vote, but all 
can be justified. 
Beyond this, there are a number of line-drawing problems. We can say 
that no one should have to wait five or six hours to vote. I agree; it is an 
outrage. But what kind of wrong is it? Is it the violation of a right? Or is it 
more like an unfortunate burden on a person’s participation—one that we 
should fix, but that there is no constitutional obligation to fix? Or what 
about the case of a ballot that is confusing and hard to read? Is it a rights 
violation, or simply a misfortune—one that we just have to let lie for the 
time being?80 
This gets us to another problem: that of remedy. What is the correct 
remedy for a long line, and how should it be implemented? Election 
remedies are notoriously tricky. If someone makes a mistake in casting her 
ballot, or if a ballot is hard to read, can she have a revote? This creates all 
sorts of problems, even in these cases where the value of participation has 
been lost and so too, arguably, the right to vote. If we allowed a 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190-91 (2008); Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). 
 80. The problem should be fixed as soon as possible, however, and with deference to 
the idea that we should not change the rules of the election game right before an election (or 
right after). 
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constitutional challenge in all of these cases, we would be hard pressed to 
find a way to fix all of them. Sometimes, of course, the fault lies with the 
voter and nothing should be done; but sometimes the fault really is in the 
election system. But even in those cases, it may be better to say that we 
have lost a good thing than that a right has been violated. 
B. Equality 
If the previous section in some way disparaged the value of the right to 
vote, this section needs to partially take that back. Even though there may 
be some violations of the right to vote which are trivial when taken as an 
individual matter, things change when a group is targeted. A minor barrier 
which some group has to face taken as a group is something much more 
serious than a minor barrier that you or I happen to face as a contingent 
matter (for example, if I get a flawed ballot which neither I nor any poll 
worker notices and as a result my vote gets thrown out). If African 
Americans have to work harder to get to vote than other people, then this is 
wrong quite independently of how much harder they have to work. 
What goes wrong here is not a violation of the value of participation per 
se, but rather the problem of a violation of political equality: we say that 
one group is less than another, expressively, and we may disproportionately 
exclude those people from the political process in a way that only shows up 
because they face a barrier that other people do not face. If everybody 
faced the same obstacle, no expressive disrespect would be shown, and no 
selective exclusion would be present. It might be a bad thing, but it would 
not be bad from the perspective of equality; and if it is not that bad, it might 
not even be bad from the perspective of participation. It might just be one 
of those things that we need to fix, eventually. 
At the end of the day, equal participation probably ends up as the main 
issue in the voting wars. We should make changes because it should be 
easier for people to vote, but what is most pressing is if the status quo of 
some existing arrangements makes being able to vote unequal for certain 
groups of people, for people in different districts, or for people in different 
states. But we should not confuse not having it as good as other people 
with the denial of the value of participation. The former aims for equality; 
the latter aims for “good enough.” The fact that we all have to stand in line 
is bad, but if voters in poor and black districts have to stand in line while 
voters in rich and white districts do not, this is very bad, and possibly a 
rights violation—not a violation of the right to vote, but a violation of the 
right to equal protection. 
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C. Fixing Elections and Fixing American Politics 
If more people participated, would this be good? I do not mean in asking 
this to imply that some people should not vote, or not be able to vote, 
because they believe the wrong things or do not know the right things. This 
seems to me a wrongheaded and mostly silly view. But we can ask if more 
of the values of participation would be realized by more people voting. This 
is not as easy of a question to answer. Certainly, it is better for the 
individual intrinsic good of participation. More people voting means more 
people consenting and having a role in choosing how their government 
should run. This seems undeniable. But what about the other values? 
If more people participated, then America would be more democratic—
not only in the sense that we give people a de jure right to vote, but also 
when this right is actually used. We would be a more active democracy, not 
merely a passive one, and each additional person voting makes us 
incrementally more democratic. But, of course, not participating can be one 
way of expressing one’s views of politics, and there are other ways of 
participating (writing, speaking out, or protesting) that may be as effective 
and expressive as the right to vote. Voting is expressive as well, and more 
people voting means that more of a certain type of expression is occurring. 
More participation would probably also give more information about 
what people are feeling and what they think ought to be done. Although it is 
also possible that more people voting may simply give a muddier signal: 
new voters may cancel other new voters out.81 Do countries where voting is 
mandatory have more information about what their voters want than 
countries where voting is voluntary? It is hard to say, partly because part of 
knowing what voters are saying is interpreting election results, and these 
can be pretty noisy. Did they vote for the new candidate or against the 
incumbent? Did they give the winner a mandate or not? So more 
participation may mean more information; however, it is an open question 
about whether it gives better information. 
Nor does greater participation necessarily mean better government. More 
voters may mean more ignorant voters (though current voters are already 
ignorant). But just as the ignorance of voters does not itself make their 
participation valueless or worthless, the fact that more voters will not help 
matters does not hurt the cause of greater participation, and will in many 
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skewed in one way or the other. 
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ways obviously help it. Ignorant voters (however we define this phrase) still 
have the right to vote, their voting is an expressive act, and it has an 
informational function, and the more voters there are, the more these values 
will get realized. 
Finally, more participation will not necessarily mean less polarized 
politics.82 The section on polarization above indicated that the hope was 
that if we got politics out of election administration, this would make a lot 
of the problems with voting—long lines, bad ballots, etc.—at least seem 
more manageable. We would not be using electoral machinery as a means 
to push a party ahead.83 We would come together to see a common 
problem, rather than a chit to fight over. 
But what would we gain? Voting would be easier for some, and perhaps 
our elections would be more reflective of the democratic will. But this is 
unclear. Moreover, it is not clear that, even if everyone voted, our actual 
politics would be any less polarized, any less gridlocked, or any less 
acrimonious.84 We should avoid seeing the problems manifested in our 
contemporary politics as really problems of not enough people voting, 
because they probably are not. The causes go much deeper than this, and, in 
fact, fights over election administration are probably as much symptoms of 
polarization as they are the cause of polarization.85 
Professor Hasen ends his book on a mostly pessimistic note.86 He thinks 
that the problems of polarization run too deep to make realistic electoral 
reform possible.87 The problem is that one party (usually the Republicans) 
sometimes stands to benefit from electoral dysfunction.88 More generally, 
offices of electoral administration are seen as themselves political positions, 
                                                                                                                 
 82. This is noted by Professor Hasen in his recent review of Professor Larry Lessig’s 
new book. See Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126 HARV. L. REV. 550, 583-84 
(2012) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS 
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011) and JACK ABRAMOFF, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: 
THE HARD TRUTH ABOUT WASHINGTON CORRUPTION FROM AMERICA’S MOST NOTORIOUS 
LOBBYIST (2011)). 
 83. At the same time, it may just be that part of our system is that control of the 
electoral machinery is one of the spoils of political triumph. There may be good things about 
this along with the bad. 
 84. See Hasen, supra note 82, at 583-84. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See HASEN, supra note 9, at 199 (admitting that “none” of his proposals for election 
reform will happen). 
 87. Id. at 199-201. 
 88. See id. at 198. 
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so that it is the official’s role to act in the interests of her party, rather than 
in the interests of the voter or the government.89 
Still, we might be able to take solace in the fact that even if the voting 
wars ended in a truce, it is not certain that we would gain all that much. The 
problems with elections can seem pervasive and all-encompassing, but they 
are not. For, in fact, and this is something for which we can take 
considerable pride in, not every election district is embattled, not every 
election ends in a recount, officials sometimes rise above partisanship, and, 
for the most part, those who want to vote, do. We are not China; we are not 
Russia. Things could be better: they almost always could. And we should 
incrementally try to make them better. But they could be much, much 
worse. The introduction of lawyers full of sound and fury into elections has 
obscured the reality a bit (for it is in their interest to portray election crises 
as apocalyptic), but it is still there. 
IV. Conclusion 
It is tempting to think of “participation” as solely an individual value. It 
is more tempting still to see the value of participation as exhausted in an 
analysis of the right to vote. But sometimes this perspective can obscure 
more than it illuminates. Voting is a collective good as well as an individual 
right, and so it sometimes makes sense to look at voting in the aggregate 
and not merely in terms of each individual voter. Here, whether the good of 
voting is realized is not a yes-or-no question, but more of a question of 
“how much” or a question of what is “good enough.” Not everyone can or 
will vote in an election, even when barriers to participation are relatively 
low. But can most people who want to vote do so? And is this enough of the 
people to make it plausible to speak of America as a democracy? If we can 
answer “yes” to both of these questions, many of the values of participation 
will have been realized, even though there will be individual cases in which 
the value will be realized in a diminished way, or not at all. 
The individual perspective on voting obscures in another way too. 
Voting is only one way of participating in a democracy. It may be the best 
way, though I am not sure about this. We can run for office, we can run 
someone’s campaign, or we can simply run our mouth about the important 
issues of the day. All of these are vital to democracy, and some are arguably 
more vital than the simple, boring, and many times meaningless act of 
pulling a lever or pushing a button on a touch screen. My list of the values 
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of participation describes values that are not only realized in voting. Apathy 
about politics is not necessarily solved by getting more people to vote. 
In this respect, too much focus on the voting wars may limit our 
understanding of the possible solutions to the wars—solutions which may 
have more to do with reducing polarization or political apathy, limiting the 
role money can play in politics, or even changing rules about Senate 
debates.90 So it may be misleading to talk voting wars, as if there was one 
big, relatively well-defined thing (called “voting”) we were fighting over 
and two sides and the possibility of an ending. What we have are a number 
of democratic battles, some at the state level and some at the local level, 
some within election law and some outside of it, some more important than 
others, some of which we are winning, some of which we will never win, 
but all of which are worth fighting. If it sometimes seems we have a long 
way to go, we only have to remind ourselves how far it is we have come. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 90. This point is emphasized by James Gardner in his recent book. See JAMES A. 
GARDNER, WHAT ARE CAMPAIGNS FOR?: THE ROLE OF PERSUASION IN ELECTORAL LAW AND 
POLITICS, at x (2009) (“In a democracy, the electoral compromises but a small fraction of the 
political, and if we are concerned to assure the health of our democracy, it is to the political, 
in the broadest sense, that we must attend.”). 
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